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Abstract
The goal of the thesis is to address solution to security threats faced currently by the
transactions among devices in Industry 4.0 network. In order to address the cyber
threats a demo version of a distributed light weight trust infrastructure is designed and
developed, which makes use of the existing Internet Domain Name System (DNS) and
its global trust anchor. Since it has high scalability and eases the burden on relying
parties, in turn allows for highly efficient queries to support individual trust decisions. In
this demo version a standalone private DNS infrastructure including Top Level Domains
has to be developed with Raspberry pi Cluster. Further, the Security of the DNS for the
trust infrastructure is enhanced in this demo version by implementing DNSSEC and also
DANE Protocol with TLSA Resource Records. It also includes the core functionality of the
Lightweight Infrastructure for Global Heterogeneous Trust management in support of an
open Ecosystem of Stakeholders and Trust schemes. (LIGHTEST) example: Developing
Trust Lists, Trust Scheme Publication Authority [7]. In the thesis a demo version of
distributed light weight trust infrastructure is developed and visualized practically by
designing an infrastructure for validation and authentication of data in the Sensor
network of an organization using a Raspberry pi Cluster and also the flexibility of
the light weight infrastructure is discussed by considering four important scenarios
which can over come the issues of data authentication in current Industry 4.0 predictive
maintenance system. Also two different applications of Block chain technology related
to data authentication in Industry 4.0 is discussed. Based on one of the block chain
application "the Block chain based PKI management system" an idea is proposed how this
can be incorporated into an IOT sensor network for certificate validation. Finally the two
technologies block chain and distributed light weight trust infrastructure using DNS are
analyzed based on five parameters namely performance, maintainability, manageability,
security and cost.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Globally, every second enormous amount of transactions are conducted virtually over
the Internet, in which decision on verifying who is on the other end of the transaction is
important. Therefore, it is necessary to have assistance from trust infrastructure authori-
ties to certify the trustworthiness of electronic identities, which is already implemented
by many security algorithm and Certificate Authorities(CA). But querying the trust in-
frastructure authorities in a secured manner without disturbing the end to end trust is a
challenging task leading the verifiers to deal with high number of formats and protocols.
In order to address this problem, the EU-funded LIGHTest project (http://lightest.eu/)
Co-ordinated by Fraunhofer IAO in Stuttgart which attempts to build a Global Distributed
Trust Infrastructure[4], which provides a solution that allows to distinguish legitimate
identities from scoundrel ones. This efficient trust infrastructure finds its application
ranging from verification of electronic signatures, over e-Procurement, e-Justice, e-
Health, and law enforcement, up to the verification of trust in sensors and devices in the
Internet of Things.
1.2 Goal
The thesis focuses mainly on security of Industry 4.0. The aim is to build a live demo
of data authentication of sensor network in Industry 4.0 environment based on the
light weight distributed trust infrastructure proposed by the LIGHTest project. The
complete demo is build using the Raspberry pi cluster. Also two different applications
of Block chain technology related to data authentication in Industry 4.0 is discussed.
Based on one of the block chain application "the Block chain based PKI management
system" an idea is proposed how this can be incorporated into an IOT sensor network
for certificate validation. The distributed trust infrastructure using DNS is analyzed with
Block chain technology in terms of five parameters namely performance, maintainability,
manageability, security and cost.
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1.3 Structure
The remaining structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter two introduces about
Industry 4.0 framework requirements, different technologies used in Industry 4.0 and
about short comings of the existing security infrastructures followed in Industry 4.0.
Chapter3 introduces to the DNS, DNSSEC, overview of LIGHtest concept. Chapter4
discusses about the architecture used to design the data authentication in an IOT sensor
network and the results of implementation with four different scenarios is discussed.
Chapter5 discusses about two application of Block chain technology. Chapter 6 compares
and contrasts the light weight distributed trust infrastructure with the Block chain
technology.
A part of this work was written as a paper entitled "Implementation of Distributed Light
weight trust infrastructure for automatic validation of faults in an IOT sensor network"
has been reviewed and selected for publication in "The Open Identity Summit" held at
Garmisch, Germany during March 28-29, 2019.
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2.1 Industry 4.0 framework Requirements
2.1.1 Industry 4.0 evolution
The first three industrial revolutions have brought mechanization, electricity and infor-
mation technology (IT) to human manufacturing. Indeed, there is another technological
revolution blooming, but it’s far simpler and at the same time potentially more ground-
breaking than any single device. It is a data-driven revolution that could do away with
many inefficiencies, inconveniences , risks, unsafe practices of modern world and its
called Internet of Things (IOT) [19].The evolution of Industry 4.0 is shown in Figure
2.1 [19]. Even though the technology that comprises IOT has been around for years,
we’re only in its very earliest stages. The number of connected equipment’s today pales
in comparison to how many will be connected in just five years. Estimates vary, but the
range of connected objects by 2025 will be about 100 billion. It includes everything
from small objects like cups and pens to large objects like homes, cars, and industrial
equipment. As one of the most high-tech manufacturing countries, Germany holds
many of the most sophisticated manufacturing companies and large industries with
latest technologies[27].The passive machines and robots have replaced the labour forces,
which means they are controlled by a human without consciousness.
However, it is still expensive in its use of employees and additional resources required
for controlling, checking, or efficient maintenance. Recently, benefiting from the Internet
of things (IOT) and Cyber Physical Systems (CPS), the industry-relevant items, for
example, material, sensors, machines, products, supply chain, and customers, are able to
be connected, which means these necessary objects are going to exchange information
and control actions with each other independently and autonomously. In 2012, German
scientists realized that manufacturing has been developed into a new paradigm shift,
so-called ‘Industry 4.0’, where products tend to control their own manufacturing process-
ing [23]. Since then, the term of Industry 4.0 is one of the most popular manufacturing
topics among industry and academia in the world and has also been considered as the
fourth industrial revolution with radical impact on manufacturing in future [3].
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Figure 2.1: Evolution of Industry 4.0 [19]
2.1.2 Different technologies in Industry 4.0
Industry 4.0 has classified nine technologies as shown in Figure 2.2[11] namely Aug-
mented Reality, Additive Engineering, Autonomous Robots, Big data analytics, Horizontal
and vertical system integration, Simulation, Industrial Internet of Things, Cloud, Cyber
security.
They will work together to transform production - as isolated, optimized cells come
together as a fully integrated, automated, and optimized production flow. This will
lead to greater efficiency’s and changing traditional production relationships between
suppliers, producers and customers. This chapter will be discussing more about cyber
security parameters, threats, and how to over come the threats.
2.1.3 Cyber Security
Due to increased connectivity and use of standardized communication protocols that
come with Industry 4.0, the need to protect critical industrial systems and manufacturing
lines from cyber security threats increases dramatically[40]. So the secure, reliable
communications with sophisticated identity and access management of machines and
users are essential. The strong connection among physical devices and their services
with the digital world can improve the quality of information required for planning,
optimization and operation of manufacturing systems [19]. The term CPS has been
16
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Figure 2.2: Different Technologies in Industry 4.0 [11]
defined as the systems in which natural and human made systems (physical space)
are tightly integrated with computation, communication, and control systems (cyber
space). Decentralization and autonomous behavior of the manufacturing process are the
main characteristics of CPS. The evolution of CPS mainly depend on the adoption and
reconfiguration of existing product life cycle with a collaborative Cyber physical systems.
Secure Data exchange can be is carried out continuously by linking cyber physical sys-
tems intelligently with the data storage devices (Example: Cloud environment) in real
time . Digital Shadow of Production is defined as the representation of physical object
in virtual environment. The essential requirement of real time oriented manufacturing
systems and optimization of production system is achieved by massive considerations of
cyber physical systems . Use of appropriate sensors in CPS should find out the failure
occurring in machines and automatically stimulate repair actions on CPS. Which in
turn finds the optimum usage of each work station with the help of cycle time required
17
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for the operation performed on that particular station . The 5C structure uses cloud
computing to communicate with the machines (machine with a machine or human with
a machine). E.g., The smart autonomous vehicle is a typical Cyber-Physical System
combined production to represent the development of Industry 4.0. In this production
environment a data mining method is used for the route prediction, which achieves 80
% prediction accuracy . US Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) developed five critical functions necessary to make security effective
on an ongoing basis namely Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover [9] [22].
Identify Develop the institutional understanding to manage Cyber security risk to
organizational systems, assets, data, and capabilities, i.e. Asset Management, Business
Environment, Governance, Risk Assessment, and Risk Management Strategy.
Protect Develop and implement the relevant safeguards to ensure delivery of criti-
cal infrastructure services, i.e. restrict or incorporate the impact of a potential Cyber
security event.
Detect Develop and implement the applicable activities to identify the occurrence
of a Cyber security event; i.e. enable appropriate timely discovery of Cyber security
events.
Respond Develop and implement the convenient activities to take action regarding
the detected Cyber security event; i.e. it must contain the impact of a potential Cyber
security event.
Recover Develop and implement the relevant activities to maintain plans for resilience
and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a Cyber security
event; i.e. timely recovery to normal operations in order to reduce the impact of a Cyber
security event.
2.1.4 Cyber security threats to IOT systems
IOT facilitate integration between the physical world and computer communication
networks, and applications (apps) such as infrastructure management and environmen-
tal monitoring make privacy and security techniques critical for future IOT systems
[45]. Consisting of radio frequency identifications (RFIDs), wireless sensor networks
(WSNs), and cloud computing [44],IoT systems are vulnerable to network attacks,
physical attacks, software attacks and privacy leakage [2]. The IOT security threats are
18
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as follows.
• DoS Denial of Service (DoS) attackers aims to restrain IOT devices from inheriting
the network and computation resources [37].
• DDoS Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attackers with hundreds of IP ad-
dresses make it more difficult to distinguish the genuine IoT device traffic from
attack traffic. Distributed IOT devices with light-weight security protocols are
especially prone to DDoS attacks .
• Jamming attackers send fake signals to suspend the ongoing radio transmissions
of IOT devices and further diminish their energy, bandwidth, central processing
units (CPUs) and memory resources of IOT devices or sensors during their failed
communication attempts [14].
• Spoofing: A spoofing node impersonates a legal IOT device with its identity such
as the medium access control (MAC) address, Universally Unique Identifier (UUID)
and RFID tag to gain illegal access to the IOT network system .
• Man-in-the-middle attack: A Man-in-the-middle attacker sends jamming and
spoofing signals with the goal of secretly monitoring, eavesdropping and altering
the private communication between IOT devices [44].
• Software attacks: Mobile malicious software’s such as Trojans, ransom ware,
worms, and virus can result in the privacy leakage, data theft, economic loss,
power depletion and network performance deterioration of IOT systems [45].
• Privacy leakage: IOT systems have to protect the privacy of the user during
data caching and exchange. Some caching owners are inquisitive about the data
contents stored on their devices and analyze and sell it to third parties for large
amount of money.For example: In recent days Wearable devices that collect user’s
personal information such as location and health had witnessed an increased risk
of personal privacy leakage [45].
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2.2 Security standards and Infrastructures used in IOT
networks
2.2.1 PKI based open source Infrastructures
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [43] is a cryptographic technique that bind public keys
with respective identities of entities (like organizations). The binding is established
through a process of registration and issuance of certificates at and by a certificate
authority (CA). which also allows to create set of roles, policies, procedures and in turn
manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates and manage public-key
encryption [7][15]. The purpose of a PKI is to facilitate the secure electronic transfer of
information for a range of network activities such as e-commerce, internet banking and
confidential email. Nowadays due to increase of devices in IOT there are open source
PKI infrastructures for example: IOT_pki which can be used to create certificate easily
and verify digital signatures .
2.2.2 Limitations of PKI infrastructure
In general, there are many certificate-based solution which are suitable for Interent of
Things applications. For example: Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), in which verification
of all identities are allowed, provided they are appropriately registered via the approved
certificate authorities. Standard methods such as a PKI are often limited for the current
IOT standards because they are often too expensive [33] since large number of devices
are connected to the network. The critical weakness in the way the current X.509 scheme
implemented is that any CA trusted by a particular party can then issue certificates for
any domain they choose. Such certificates will be accepted as valid by the trusting party
whether they are legitimate and authorized or not. This is a serious shortcoming given
that the most commonly encountered technology employing X.509 [43] and trusted
third parties is the https protocol. As all major web browsers are distributed to their
end users pre-configured with a list of trusted CAs that numbers in the dozens this
means that any one of these pre-approved trusted CAs can issue a valid certificate for
any domain whatsoever. The industry response to this has been muted. Given that
the contents of a browser’s pre-configured trusted CACertificate Authority (CA) list is
determined independently by the party that is distributing or causing to be installed
the browser application there is really nothing that the CAs themselves can do. This
issue is the driving impetus behind the development of the DNS-based Authentication of
Named Entities (DANE) protocol. If adopted in conjunction with Domain Name System
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Security Extensions (DNSSEC), DANE will greatly reduce if not completely eliminate the
role of trusted third parties in a domain’s PKI.
2.2.3 Suggestions by IUNO for IOT security
The aim of the IUNO project (https://iuno-projekt.de/) is to identify and develop new
security practices for IOT network [21]. Due to digitization there is a networking of
small and large scale production enterprises to the Internet for smart monitoring. But
the security of data, secure processes, secure networking seems to be the complex
issue in Industry 4.0. So IUNO has identified four challenges in the IT security namely
authenticity, integrity, availability and confidentiality. Based on this challenges several
security infrastructures were analyzed and how LIGHTest infrastructure using DNS has
the solution to overcome the challenges will be discussed in next chapter.
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3 Overview of LIGHTest Infrastructure
In this chapter initially basis of DNS and the requirements of DNSSEC is introduced. In
the follow up, how the LIGHTest infrastructure uses the concepts and various features of
DNS with DNSSEC to build an light weight security infrastructure is discussed. And the
following sections are summarized from a LIGHTest public deliverable[17]
3.1 Introduction to DNS
3.1.1 Domain Names
As the Internet started to grow from a few users into a complex interconnected network
of workstations, the idea of a hierarchical naming scheme for hosts emerged in late
20th century. The term Domain Name Systems was first introduced in RFC(Requests for
comments)799 at 1981 written by Dr. David Mills. Instead of communally agreeing on
names for each and every host, each site would name its own hosts and the community
at large only needed to agree on names for the sites. To identify a host globally, the host’s
name needed to be qualified with the name of the site, more abstractly called the domain
of the host. This system was further refined as the network kept growing. The sites in
turn became too large and were split into a number of sub-sites each controlling its own
names. This split was reflected in the name of the domain: it became a composite of the
name of the sub-site and the site. Additional splits would increase the components in
this composite. As a result, the name space created by these names has a hierarchical
structure. More specifically in the form of the tree: the sites are child nodes of the tree’s
root, the sub-sites are child nodes of their parent (sub-) sites, and the hosts are child
nodes of their (sub-) sites.
Apart from looking familiar to anyone accustomed to how people are named in Western
culture, this bottom-up scheme has the advantage that the root node is the last node
in each and every (complete) domain name. If it is given a unique label, this label
becomes a natural end-of-name marker making it unnecessary to invent an explicit
marker or store the length of the name. And indeed, in DNS the root node is the only
one that has an empty label. All other labels are strings of up to 63 bytes. The ASCII
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character set is used to interpret the individual bytes. This is important, since labels are
case-insensitive. That is, ‹example›, ‹Example›, and ‹EXAMPLE› are all the same label.
However, since ASCII only defines byte values up to 127, all values greater than that are
quietly left without an interpretation. On top of this very generous specification exist
a convention that limits the characters allowed in the labels that are part of domain
names that designate hosts. Here, only letters, digits, and hyphens are allowed with the
further restriction that the label must start with a letter and not end with a hyphen. As
the vast majority of labels are indeed used for form host names, this rule has become
the de-facto standard.
3.1.2 Distributed Authority
As mentioned, one important goal for the design of the DNS was to avoid a central
registry in control of all names and resource records and allow participants in the
network to independently administer their data. This means that there is a certain way
needed to discover to whom the certain name belonged to and in terms of network
service, where that operator would serve the data from. Given the potentially vast size
of the domain name space, it wasn’t practical to store ownership with each domain
name. Instead, DNS provides the means to cut the name space into contiguous regions
of nodes that are all under the same ownership. These regions are called zones. The
resource records owned by all the names in a zone are controlled by the zone and are
served by the same set of servers. The zone is said to be authoritative for the domain
names that are part of the zone. The servers that can be queried to deliver the resource
records owned by these names are authoritative name servers (often shortened to just
name server when there is no ambiguity). Because in a tree all contiguous regions are
themselves trees, the zones are trees under a top-most node called the zone’s apex.
This node is reachable from all other nodes of the zone by simply walking upwards.
Additionally, it is the first node of a zone encountered when traversing from the DNS
root. It therefore makes sense to store all necessary administrative information with
this apex. The node just above the apex is part of a different zone. Control needs to
be transferred from one zone to another between those two nodes. This is called a
zone cut and happens by mirroring some of the information of the apex node of the
descendant zone with the parent zone. Thus, the servers responsible for the parent
zone have knowledge that the apex node of the child zone exists and can provide all
those records for this apex node that are required to discover the child zone properly.
These records are called delegation records since they delegate control to the sub zones.
Classic DNS requires only one type of delegation records: NS (or Name Server) records.
Each of these records gives the domain name for one host operating a name server
authoritative for the zone.
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3.1.3 Management of Zone data
The primary server, regardless of whether it is hidden or public, needs to have access
to the data of the zone: all the resource records for nodes that are part of the zone as
well as delegation and glue records. The original specification suggested to use a simple
text file for this format representing each of the records in a standardized format. Since
these files contain the one true version of the zone data, they are called master files by
the DNS specification and zone files in practice. Their format is essentially the same as
in the examples given above. Each line contains one resource record. The line starts
with the domain name of the record’s owner. Since all such names have to be within
the zone they end with the domain name of the zone’s apex, called the origin. To save
people a lot of time, the names can be given relative to this origin. If they end properly
in a dot they are complete domain names and if they are not, the origin is appended
to complete them. For instance, to include records for ‹sample1.example.com› as part
of the zone ‹example.com› the domain name stated for these records could either be
‹sample1.example.com.› (note the trailing dot) or just ‹sample1›. If the previous record
was for sample1 too, the name can also be left out and the line be indented with a least
one white-space character instead. The domain name is followed by the Time to Live
(TTL), the class, and the resource record type. The former is a number while the latter
two are the mnemonics used for class and type. Since these mnemonics are taken from
a single shared name space of only letters, the order of the three elements doesn’t have
importance. However, since TTL and class are optional, the type always needs to be at
the last. If left out, both are replaced by the last distinctly stated value. The record type
is followed by a textual depiction of the record data. This representation is specified for
each record type. Thus, whoever reads the zone file needs to know about all the record
types used in the file and their textual representation
3.1.4 Message size limits
Recursive discovery of name servers requires a re cursor to hastily fire off requests to a
number of different servers. This process needs to be fast if it shouldn’t be subjected
to a large delay in an application. A connection-oriented transport protocol such as
TCP requires a number of round-trips just to establish a connection before any payload
data can be exchanged among two parties. On the other hand, most connection-less
protocol such as UDP don’t have certainty in packet delivery. The only way to deal with
packet loss is to stop waiting for a response after a certain time and declare the packet
as lost. In order to promote the faster response time, the much more common ‘happy
path,’ DNS uses UDP.This, however, has one additional drawback: When using UDP,
DNS messages need to fit into a single IP version 6 packet. The initial DNS specification
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therefore limited the size of DNS messages when using UDP to a conservative 512 bytes.
An extension mechanism has since allowed to increase the size where knowledge of the
underlying network topology allows. In practice, the limit is 1280 bytes. This still isn’t
abominable but lot of requirements has to be considered when designing applications
and extensions for DNS. Data sets when become large cannot be stored in DNS directly.
Instead, a better strategy is to only store pointers in DNS describing how data sets can
be retrieved using other protocols. for example: Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs),
a standard mechanism describing both the protocol to be used and the location of
resources, are a prime candidate for such a pointer.
3.2 Why DNSSEC?
3.2.1 Threats to DNS
• Man in the Middle Attacks
The Man in the Middle Attacks (MIMA) is one of the most often deployed computer
based hacking technique. In DNS protocol if the hacker has access to the resolver of
certain client, he can manipulate the data based on his interest. The corresponding
DNS name server doesn’t send the authentication or verification details to the
clients. So, the receiver of data from a DNS name server does not know the
authenticity of orgin of data or a way to verify the integrity of path of the data.
Also in resolver there is no mechanism to verify the authenticity or integrity of
data because resolver can only verify the authenticity of the data packet using the
source IP address of the DNS server, source and destination port numbers and DNS
transaction ID. The attacker can easily manipulate the data packets by sending
different message for the same parameters. So the receiver who receives the data
just check the integrity of parameters and accepts the data to be true.
• Cache Poisoning
The most important component in DNS architecture is ability to cache responses to
queries in order to reduce the access time of the DNS service. Nowadays most of
the DNS servers cache all the information for all the zones for which corresponding
server is authoritative, and also the recursive queries performed since their last
start up time. DNS cache poisoning involves replacing the information of the cache
records. So when the DNS server queries the same query at later time , it will be
routed to different server.
• Name Chaining
The variation of cache poisoning is achieved by resource records whose record data
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includes a domain name which in turn can be used as a place where an attacker
puts wrong data into a target’s cache. The most affected in this class of records are
CNAME, NS. False information, associated with these names, can be injected into
the victim’s cache using the additional section of the response. An attacker can
acquaint arbitrary DNS names of his choice, and provide additional information
that is claimed to be yoked with those names.
3.2.2 Digital signature of DNS records
In order to be able to respond to these threats, a resolver needs to be provided with a
way to verify the authenticity of the resource records it receives as answers to queries. A
common strategy for verifying the authenticity of data is to use public-key cryptography
to provide signatures of the data [20].
In the case of the DNS, a network user wishes to verify that the data received in response
to some query is authentic. The data to be signed is the DNS message answering the
query. It needs to be signed by whoever assembled it – and the user needs access to the
public key of that party.
This is exactly what DNSSEC does: when updating a zone’s data, all the resource records
for the same domain name, class, and record type are collected into a resource record
set – written and even pronounced as RRset. A digital signature is then created for this
RRset. Before that happens the records are sorted into a well-defined order, though,
so that a client can do the same when later re-creating the digest for verification. This
signature needs to be published. Yet the existing DNS protocol shouldn’t be changed
in any way disturbing operation of clients and resolvers that aren’t aware of DNSSEC.
Which means that the message format needs to remain the same. Luckily, the DNS
provides means for extension, one of which is additional resource record types. Enter
the RRSIG record: one such record will be added for each RRset of the zone. It will be
stored under the same domain name and class as those of the RRset and contains the
record type and signature as well as some additional bookkeeping information as the
record data.
3.2.3 Chain of keys
In security chain of trust is very essential to overcome the Man in middle of attacks.
Because using DNSSEC it’s not only mandatory to just sign only the zone files, the more
important is how to establish the chain of trust from bottom child zone till the top root
zone. A zone is normally allowed to use more than one key at a time and are published
in the form of DNSKEY records under the domain name of the apex of the zone.
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Digest of the child keys called fingerprint is published in DS records as a part of
delegation records in the parent zone, and then this parent zone which includes DS
record is signed by the parent zone private keys to create an RRSIG record. So when a
domain is secured by DNSSEC this chain of trust is maintained from bottom child zone
till the root zone. By doing we can establish the trust link between parent and child
zone , and also it is ensured that our child zone is always bind with the trusted parent in
the domain.
3.2.4 DANE Protocol
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) is an Internet security proto-
col , that allows digital certificates to safeguard the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
[16].Which are bound to Domain Name Systems using DNSSEC. Till today TLS encryp-
tion is based on certificates issued by CA, but in the last few years a large number of CA
providers under went serious security compromises by issuing certificates for any domain
name. But DANE permits the administrator of a domain name by storing the keys of
the TLS clients in the Domain Name System (DNS), there by giving restricted access
[12]. By doing this DANE solves the problem of certificate transparency by ensuring
anonymous CAs cannot issue certificate without permission of the administrator and
also it ensures DNS certification Authority Authorization by limiting the CAs access to
issue certificates for a corresponding domain.
3.3 Concept of LIGHTest Infrastructure
Figure 3.1 shows the LIGHTest reference architecture. From this reference architecture
it is understood, that how a Verifier can automatically validate an electronic transaction
based on the trust policies and queries to the LIGHTest infrastructure [30]. Verifiers use
special policy authorizer tools to state trust policies. The tools will be helpful for non
technical persons for easily creating and understanding trust policies, which can then be
applied by the Automatic Trust Verifier (ATV)
Trust Scheme Publication Authority (TSPA) [29] is one of the major component in
this LIGHTest infrastructure. This is an independent component which manages all
the trust lists [10]. Since size DNS zone file is limited , the details of the trust list is
completely stored in the TSPA. For example:TSPA can be implemented in http protocol
and DNS server can contain pointers in the zone file, which automatically redirects
to the http page. This is one of the efficient method to handle huge volumes of data.
The transport layer of TSPA is also secured and its integrity is maintained by TLSA
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Figure 3.1: LIGHTest Reference Architecture [30]
component in the zone file of DNS.
Since LIGHTest is a global infrastructure with different trust schemes and in order
to make it easy for verifiers, Trust Translation Authorities(TTAs) to map different levels
of foreign trust scheme to its equivalent domestics scheme. For example, an American
authentication security of Level 3 could be mapped to the eIDAS level substantial[26].
Nowadays , most of the electronic transactions are not directly signed by the per-
son who’s responsible for the information, it’s basically done by a third party trust
provider based on delegation. Therefore LIGHTest addresses the delegation problems by
Delegation Publisher (DP) component, which in turn can permit verifier to query the
details of delegations .
All the components like Trust translation authority, Delegation publisher, trust scheme
publication authority are implemented as DNS name servers[5]. Also, DANE (DNS-based
Authentication of Named Entities) standard is being applied, which uses DNSSEC to
derive trust in TLSA server certificates. The complete infrastructure is discussed in detail
in the next chapter.
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system using Raspberry Pi cluster
4.1 Architecture of data authentication in IOT Sensor
network system using DNS
EU research project LIGHTest proposed to develop a light weight Identity Management
System which uses the Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure of Internet. The secu-
rity mechanisms of the DNS is enhanced by Domain Name System Security Extensions
DNSSEC and DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) which offer together
the worldwide available and accepted central root certificate (trust anchor) and also the
ability to operate in a hierarchical structure with its own DNS server whose Identity then
on the given to continuous certificate chain up to the root certificate to make it secured.
The distributed hierarchy infrastructure of DNS can be used to create distributed
trust policies which are independent of each other, also it reduces the complexity and
management of devices in the IOT network. For example, the manufacturer of sen-
sors has its own trust policies and certificates to verify certificate of sensor. LIGHTest
offers the possibility to reduce the customer overload not by storing and managing
each and every sensor certificates in its IOT network. Which will be taken care by the
manufacturer, but the customer DNS server has to trust the trust scheme publication
authority of the manufacturer. This reduces the complexity of the network and also it
gives the manufacturer to take care of all the certificates and decides policies based on
the situation.
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4.1.1 Distributed Authority of DNS
In the concept of data authentication in an IOT sensor network, a company which has
branches in many countries is considered and how all the sensors of the smart machines
from different locations are brought into the DNS server and linked to the corresponding
trust scheme publication authority .But in general this application can also be used in a
small scale with in a production plant among different sections or in a medium scale by
connecting different plants in the same city or in a large scale by connecting branches
in different countries. So this has a wide range of flexibility. To explain the concept
in a simplified way two countries namely Germany and India are considered and the
distributed authority of DNS with hierarchical binding of zones is shown in Figure 4.1
.The explanation of this figure is as follows.
The top level of the domain is considered as raspidemo. and under this comes
two secondary domains namely germany.raspidemo. ,india.raspidemo. with two
separate zone file. And all the details of the sensors are located in the correspond-
ing zone file. Since each country sensors may have different trust schemes, so trust
scheme comes in the third zone of the DNS server as trust.germany.raspidemo. and
trust.india.raspidemo. In the first part, the construction of three level domain name
system structure is discussed and in the second part, the establishment of chain of
trust among the three level domain structure using DNSSEC is discussed. In order
to develop a three level domain name system the connection has to be established
among three levels with the help of Name servers (NS). Since raspidemo. is the top
level domain it should contain Name Server (NS) and address (A) record of its im-
mediate child zone in its zone file. germany.raspidemo. and india.raspidemo. are
the two immediate child’s of raspidemo., the corresponding name servers of the child
senname.germany.raspidemo., senname.india.raspidemo. and its address record
(10.36.28.214) is included in the raspidemo. zone file. In order to make the system
simplified , both the child’s are running on the same system but as different zone files,
So they have same address record. Now the second level domain germany.raspidemo.
and india.raspidemo. has to be connected to third level by containing the Name server
(NS) senname.trust.germany.raspidemo., senname.trust.germany.raspidemo. and
address (A) 10.36.28.213 records of third level domain in the corresponding zone file.By
doing this a private domain name system is formed and in order to make it more secure
chain of trust is established among the zone file using DNSSEC. The trust is established
by signing each zone file containing DNSKEY record by private key , which in turn gener-
ate Digest (DS) record as fingerprint and this DS record is given to the immediate parent
of the corresponding zone file and this is followed till root. In this implementation the
third level zone files trust.india.raspidemo. and trust.germany.raspidemo. containg
DNSKEY record is signed by the corresponding private key of the zone file and DS record
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is generated, which is further given to germany.raspidemo. and india.raspidemo.
These second level zone file should contain the DS record on the child nodes and
then signing is performed using the corresponding private key of the zone file and
DS record is generated for second level zone. The DS records of germany.raspidemo.
and india.raspidemo. is furthur given to raspidemo. and then signing is performed
using the zone private key. By doing so the chain of trust is maintained between threee
levels. And in addition the transport layer security is included in the zone files of the
third level domain to verify the sensor trust schemes. For example when sensor1 from
germany (sensor1.germany.raspidemo.) wants to look for the corresponding trust
scheme, there is a PTR record in the second level which gives the domain name of the
corresponding trust scheme as (sensor1.trust.germany.raspidemo.) and also the third
level zone has TLSA records to verify the TLS certificates of the trust scheme. When
this transport layer security verification is done, the trust scheme of the corresponding
sensor has the URI pointer to the trust scheme publication authority.
4.1.2 Trust Scheme Publication Authority
A distributed trust scheme publication authority is developed as an independent server
from DNS server and is responsible for maintaining all the trust lists of the different
sensors. But DNS contains certain specific DANE protocols to verify the transport layer
security (TLS) of the Trust scheme publication authority (TSPA) by making it secured
and also reducing the data overload at customer side. In Trust scheme publication
authority each sensor manufacturer has independent login credentials to publish their
trust lists and details of the sensor. So by using this distribution different manufactures
of sensors can be easily linked and brought together in a single network using DNS
infrastructure.
4.2 Hardware and Software used
The hardware used for this data authentication in IOT sensor network system are Rasp-
berry pi 3B development micro computers, temperature sensor used as a sensing device
and also LEDs for denoting the fault. The software used for this experiment are python
accompanied by crypto libraries, DNS BIND software, Django framework.
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4.3 Design Description
Nowadays due to huge increase in industries, which manufacture similar products there
is a great competition among them and it may go to an extend where one company can
pull down the market value of other company by doing illegal cyber security breaches
like hacking the data. So it’s important to make sure the authentication of data.
Let us assume an industrial scenario where there are lot of machines with temperature
sensors connected to it, due to some malfunction the machine may get over heated at
some course of time and it notifies to the corresponding person by giving a notification
message.
For example in the implementation structure shown in Fig 4.2 temperature sensor is
being used. Which gives an notification message when the temperature goes beyond
certain threshold, only after corresponding integrity check and Authentication with
Trust scheme authority using DNS. This is one of the possible use case of predictive
maintenance systems. The complete block diagram with data flow is shown in Fig 4.3
. The components used for the implementation are Sensor, Verifier, DNS server, Trust
scheme publication authority and Supplier which are discussed as follows.
• SENSOR: when the temperature goes beyond certain threshold , the sensor estab-
lishes communication with the verifier and notifies about the fault in the device.
• VERIFIER: It is the powerful system or a super computer of our network which
co-ordinates and take all the decisions with respect to Integrity , confidentiality
verification of the system and authentication of the data.
• DNS SEVRER: In this implementation a three level domain is used as shown in
Fig 4.4 with .raspidemo as top level domain and also acting as a resolver. Under
this domain comes the secondary level domain which contains different zone files
based on different countries. And in the corresponding country zone files all the
sensor details will be stored based on their names. There is a possibility to create
different trust schemes for different sensors. The trust scheme is maintained in the
third level domain. Which contains the details of the trust scheme publishing au-
thority for the corresponding sensor. Since we had taken example of two countries
namely Germany and India for implementation, the zone file of TLD raspidemo,
germany zone file and the trust scheme of germany zone file is shown in Fig 4.5,
4.6, 4.7.
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Figure 4.2: Raspberry pi cluster
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Figure 4.4: DNS Hierarchy
Figure 4.5: Zone file of TLD raspidemo
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Figure 4.6: Zone file of germany
Figure 4.7: Zone file of germany trust scheme
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Figure 4.8: TSPA Authority Implementation
• TRUST SCHEME PUBLICATION AUTHORITY: The trust scheme zone file of the
particular country has the URI pointer to the corresponding trust scheme publica-
tion authority (TSPA) of the sensor. There is a possibility to connect different trust
scheme publication authorities for different sensors. This TSPA is independent
server and is seperated from the DNS server. The trust scheme publication authori-
ties is responsible for the trust lists for the sensors and it gives the corresponding
manufacturer of the sensor certain log in credentials to manage the trust list. The
trust lists used in the implementation has the public key or certificate of the sensor,
supplier name and IP. By doing this decentralization each sensor manufacturer
or maintenance team of particular sensor can easily manage the public keys or
certificates based on the expiry dates When there is some fault from the sensor the
verifier notifies the corresponding supplier pointed by the trust scheme publication
authority. The complete trust scheme publication authority is build in Django rest
framework as shown in Fig 4.8.
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• SUPPLIER: A company can have different suppliers to take care of the maintenance.
Based on the availability of supplier, it’ll be updated to the corresponding trust
scheme publication authority. Verifier then redirects to the corresponding supplier.
4.4 Different scenarios implemented using Light weight
distributed DNS infrastructure
In this thesis the wide range of flexibility of light weight distributed DNS infrastructure
is discussed using the data authentication in IOT sensor network system. Here are some
of the important four scenarios which have been identified based on the day to day
issues faced by an IOT sensor network. The following scenarios are discussed based on
data authentication namely when the sensor is known, when the hacker tries to send
fake data using false sensor, example how an trusted sensor from india is verified and
also how this infrastructure has the flexibility to handle multiple sensors with different
suppliers is discussed.
4.4.1 Scenario 1: Sensor is Known
The sequence diagram of the scenario when sensor is known and trusted in the IOT
sensor network system is shown in Fig: 4.9 . And the sequence diagram is explained in
eight steps as follows.
• STEP 1: When the temperature is above 25 C the sensor notifies to the Verifier
by sending Sensor name, location and the signed data of the temperature. Here
the data is signed by the trusted private key provided by the manufacturer of the
sensor.
• STEP 2: The Verifier develops a DNS query based on the sensor name and location
and send it to the DNS resolver to make sure the corresponding query is DNSSEC
protected or not.
• STEP 3: Once the DNSSEC is verified, the same query is send again to look for
pointers to the Trust scheme provider.
• STEP 4: Now the trust scheme provider domain is verified for DNSSEC in order
to ensure integrity among the domains. And also the transport layer security of
trust scheme provider is ensured by verifying its certificates with the TLSA record
stored in the zone file.
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• STEP 5:When the integrity of DNS data is verified, then using the trust scheme
provider domain corresponding URI of the trust scheme authority is queried .
• STEP 6: Then the corresponding URI is queried using an API request to fetch the
public key or certificates of the sensor, which is used to verify the signed data of
sensor.
• STEP 7: Once this signed data is verified, the integrity among the domain including
the transport layer is ensured and also the public key or certificate used for signing
is also found to be a trusted one since the data is signed using the trusted private
key. Then again the URI is queried using an API request to fetch the supplier
ip address from the corresponding trust lists in the the trust scheme publication
authority.
• STEP 8: Based on the supplier address provided, it establishes the connection with
the corresponding supplier and there is an LED blink at the supplier denoting the
warning of the sensor.
4.4.2 Scenario 2: Sensor is Unknown
Assume a industrial scenario, where some hacker wants to send fake temperature details
from a machine to the verifier. Since the hacker will use the sensor which certificates
are not in the trust list of the manufacturer. The sequence diagram of this scenario is
shown in Fig 4.10. Th explanation is as follows.
• STEP 1: When the temperature is above 25 C the sensor notifies to the Verifier by
sending Sensor name, location and the signed data of the temperature. But now
the data is signed by an fake private key which is not provided by the manufacturer.
• STEP 2: The Verifier develops a DNS query based on the sensor name and location
and send it to the DNS resolver to make sure the corresponding query is DNSSEC
protected or not. Here it is assumed that hackers knows how to send the DNS
query to the verifier.
• STEP 3: Once the DNSSEC is verified, the same query is send again to look for
pointers to the Trust scheme provider.
• STEP 4: Now the trust scheme provider domain is verified for DNSSEC in order
to ensure integrity among the domains. And also the transport layer security of
trust scheme provider is ensured by verifying its certificates with the TLSA record
stored in the zone file.
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• STEP 5:When the integrity of DNS data is verified, then using the trust scheme
provider domain corresponding URI of the trust scheme authority is queried .
• STEP 6: Then the corresponding URI is queried using an API request to fetch the
public key or certificates of the sensor which is used to verify the signed data of
sensor and since the data signed by a fake private key which is not in the trust list
of Trust scheme publication authority, the signed data is not verified. Because of
this two step authentication the hackers attack is prevented. Suppose if a hacker
doesn’t know how to send a query the attack will be directly prevented in the
second step.
4.4.3 Scenario 3: Sensor in India
In this scenario how a trusted sensor data from India is authenticated and verified is
discussed. The corresponding sequence diagram is shown in Fig:4.11 .
• STEP 1: When the temperature is above 25 C the sensor notifies to the Verifier by
sending sensor1, india and the signed data of the temperature.
• STEP 2: The Verifier develops a DNS query(sensor1.india.raspidemo) based on
the sensor name and location and send it to the DNS resolver to make sure the
corresponding query is DNSSEC protected or not.
• STEP 3: Once the DNSSEC is verified, the same query is send again
to look for pointers to the Trust scheme provider and in turn gets (sen-
sor1.trust.india.raspidemo).
• STEP 4: Now the trust scheme provider domain is verified for DNSSEC in order
to ensure integrity among the domains. And also the transport layer security of
trust scheme provider is ensured by verifying its certificates with the TLSA record
stored in the zone file.
• STEP 5:When the integrity of DNS data is verified, then using the trust scheme
provider domain corresponding URI (http://10.36.28.212/sensordetails/4) of the
trust scheme publication authority is queried.
• STEP 6: Then the corresponding URI is queried using an API request to fetch the
public key or certificates of the sensor1 which is used to verify the signed data of
sensor1.
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• STEP 7: Once this signed data is verified, the integrity among the domain including
the transport layer is ensured and also the certificate used for signing is also found
to be a trusted one.Then again the URI is queried using an API request to fetch
the supplier ip address from the corresponding trust lists in the the trust scheme
publication authority.
• STEP 8: Based on the supplier ip address provided, verifier establishes the con-
nection with the corresponding supplier and there is an LED blink at the supplier
denoting the warning of the sensor.
4.4.4 Scenario 4: Multiple Sensors with different Suppliers
Here in this scenario the flexibility of verifier and supplier to parallely handle requests
from multiple sensors is discussed. In order to do parallel processing multi-threaded
programs have been used in the verifier and supplier. To explain this scenario two
sensors and two suppliers are considered in sequence diagram as shown in Fig: 4.12.
The sequence diagram is explained as follows.
• STEP 1: Assume when the temperature goes beyond 25 C the two sensors notifies
to the Verifier by sending Sensor name, location and the signed data of the
temperature. Here the data is signed by the trusted private key provided by the
manufacturer of the sensor.
• STEP 2: The Verifier has the capacity to handle multiple threads, so it develops
DNS query based on the number of sensors with its corresponding sensor name,
location and send it to the DNS resolver to make sure the corresponding query is
DNSSEC protected or not.
• STEP 3: Once the DNSSEC is verified, the same query is send again to look for
pointers to the Trust scheme provider.
• STEP 4: Now the trust scheme provider domain is verified for DNSSEC in order
to ensure integrity among the domains. And also the transport layer security of
trust scheme provider is ensured by verifying its certificates with the TLSA record
stored in the zone file.
• STEP 5:When the integrity of DNS data is verified, then using the trust scheme
provider domain corresponding URI of the trust scheme authority is queried .
• STEP 6: Then the corresponding URI is queried using an API request to fetch the
public key or certificates of the sensor, which is used to verify the signed data of
sensor.
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• STEP 7: Once this signed data is verified, the integrity among the domain including
the transport layer is ensured and also the public key or certificate used for signing
is also found to be a trusted one since the data is signed using the trusted private
key. Then again the URI is queried using an API request to fetch the supplier
ip address from the corresponding trust lists in the the trust scheme publication
authority.
• STEP 8: Supplier also has the capacity to handle multiple threads. Based on the
supplier address provided, Verifier establishes the connection with the correspond-
ing supplier and there is an LED blink at the supplier denoting the warning of the
sensor.
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5 Competitive technologies used for
authentication of data in IOT
As discussed in chapter2 about the five critical functions in cyber security, which have to
be strictly maintained to overcome all the possible attacks .But it’s practically impossible
because security is a field which is continuously evolving and there is no ideal system
which can be said it is 100 % secured. Instead of going through all the critical func-
tions we’ll be concentrating more detail into three security parameters namely Identify,
Detect and Protect which are very essential to authenticate the integrity of data. And
here in this chapter, two latest and important authentication applications which were
published recently on block chain technology is discussed, namely Block chain based
PKI management and validation system and authentication of data in IOT system using
Block chain.
5.1 Authentication and data Protection of IOT System using
Block chain
Smart grids are intelligent grids that combine IT technology with traditional grids to
enhance the efficiency of the energy utilization. In a smart grid environment, each
Advanced Mitigation Infrastructure is deployed in users and facilities, and can be used
to measure energy production and utilization and provide services such as resale. In a
smart grid environment [13], smart meters are needed to measure power consumption.
There is also the risk of moderating the power data transmitted from the smart meter to
charge lower or higher costs. So there is a need to introduce smart meter authentication
technology. Block chain technology have been recently introduced for authentication
and data protection of IOT systems [24]. Figure 5.1: shows the configuration of smart
grid system including smart meter. The smart meter has a module for measuring the
amount of power and is stored in a block-chain smart contract function depending on
the situation. In general, the electricity consumed through the smart meter is stored
together with the usage time. In the block chain environment, Ethereum’s smart contract
is used to put the power data on the block chain network so that all users can prove it
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Figure 5.1: Block diagram of the smart meter infrastructure [24]
and increase the reliability. Using the smart contract created with the Zero- Knowledge
Proof function [28], anonymity- enhanced block chains has been used to prevent account
information or data from being disclosed [1] [34]. In traditional systems the verifier
or a third party knows only the address of the user using which the amount of power
consumed and the amount of the fee paid can be inquired through the block.
As shown in Figure 5.2, the system consists of registration and authentication a two-step
process and a three stages of client, server, and block chain. In the block chain, the
registration phase and the authentication phase are implemented as a non - interactive
zero knowledge verification [6] function using the smart contract [35]. In the regis-
tration step, the data as variable:x to be protected by the client is input to generate a
random number as variable:g and variable:p, which are prime numbers, and the data
is regarded as a secret key, and a public key as variable:pub is generated. The data as
variable:x to be protected and the generated public key as variable:pub are transmitted
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Figure 5.2: Flow diagram of registration and authentication process [24]
to the server and is stored in the database. In the block chain, only the random values
as variable:g, variable:p and the public key as variable:pub are transmitted and stored
in the block to complete the registration. When calling the data in the proposed system,
the authentication process is performed. When the client calls the data variable:x stored
in the server, it selects the public key of data:x stored in the server’s database. A query
is made in the block chain through pubic key of the corresponding data to fetch the
random values g and p stored in the block chain. Using the random values g and p
fetched from the block chain, the server generates R1 and w by the non-interactive zero
knowledge proof with low communication burden, and transmits to the block chain [6].
The smart contract in the block chain executes the proof function using the received R1
and w and computes the value of R2 [36].
Through this, it can be proved that the value of stored data x in the server cannot
be modulated even if it is not stored directly in the block chain. Power consumed and
the amount of the fee paid can be inquired through the block.
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5.2 PKI management using Block chain
PKI framework build using Block chain has the potential to solve the short coming from
the conventional PKI, Log-based PKI and also Web of Trust [32]. The conventional PKI’S
has the limitation regarding update of Certificate Revocation List(CRL) after the expiry
of certificates and also in conventional PKI’S the x.509 certificates issued by a trusted CA
can further issue any number of certificates to its sub domain without maintaining the
chain of trust.
Due to the distributed nature and avoidance of single point-of-failure conditions Block
chain or distributed ledger technology turns to be the most intriguing technology in
Internet . Though initially block chain was mainly used in finance applications , after the
evolution of smart contracts currently it finds its applications in various fields of security.
In PKI framework development using block chain, it provides various security features
like certificate revocation, elimination of central point of failure and also authenticated
validation.
In block chain based PKI framework each CA has its own smart contract, which stores
all the hash values of the issued certificate and also the date of expiry of the certificate
[46]. Also chain of trust is established among certificates. For example if a certificate is
a CA’s certificate the complete certificate is loaded onto the smart contract , since the
certificate has the details of its issuer the smart contracts can perform validation check
of the certificate till root based on the chain of trust. The chain of trust is shown in Fig:
5.4.
Based on the concept of Block chain based PKI management system here an idea is
proposed that can be easily incorporated to an IOT sensor network as shown in Fig: 5.3
for issuance of certificates. Here a company with two different locations namely Germany
and India are considered. Each location has a separate CA with its corresponding smart
contract. And in this smart contract you can specify all set of rules based on the
different locations. But here how a sensor management system manages all the sensors
and maintains its chain of trust using the smart contract is analyzed. Since sensor
management system is the root for all sensors it gets the certificate from CA and this is
immediately updated to the smart contract with its hash value and expiry date of the
certificate. And this certificate is used to sign the sensor certificate and the corresponding
signature and issuer name is stored in sensors. So when the authenticity of sensor wants
to be verified due to the availability of issuer name it can easily go to the root and check
in the smart contract whether the chain of trust is satisfied or not and also the validity
of the certificate. In case of expiry of certificate the certificate will be automatically
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Figure 5.3: PKI management in IOT sensor network
removed by the smart contract . So if the sensor management system tries to sign sensor
using its expired certificate and when the authenticity of sensor is verified , the name
of the issuer certificate will no longer be present on the smart contract and this can
immediately inform that there is a problem with the certificate used for signing.
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Figure 5.4: Chain of trust among Certificates [46]
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In this chapter both distributed light weight infrastructure using DNS and Block chain
technology are analyzed based on some important parameters namely performance,
maintainability, manageability, security and cost.And finally in summary both technolo-
gies are compared and contrasted based on the parameters.
6.1 Block Chain Technology
1. Performance Performance evaluation is the process of measuring the performance
of a system under test in Block chain. This evaluation can cover system-wide
measures such as response time or latency, or measure-specific activities such as the
time to write a block to persistent storage. The goal of any performance evaluation
is to understand the performance of the system being tested. This often involves
measuring what happens when dependent variables are altered; for example,
measuring the throughput of the system as the number of concurrent requests is
varied. Blockchain technology has been identified as a key component to secure
transactions as well as improve automation [8]. When you think about what
blockchain does, it allows for enabling multiple parties to transact across multiple
organisations in an efficient and permanent way. The transaction time is defined
as the difference in time of submission of the request to the time the complete
request is processed. The throughput in block chain is defined as the number of
committed transactions per second. The transaction latency and throughput of
block chain is explained in mathematical terms as follows [18].
• Latency of the transaction = (Confirmation time @ network threshold) –
submit time
• Throughput of the transaction = Total committed transactions / total time in
seconds
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The transaction throughput is also in directly dependent on the number of nodes
invloved in the system, the throughput drops as the number n of nodes increases.
But an experiment has proved by enlarging the batch size seems to increase
throughput at the cost of a small increase in latency [47]. The sizes of the current
Blockchain applications are relatively small. Bitcoin is currently the largest solution
with Blockchain. The number of transactions in Bitcoin is considerably smaller
than e.g. in VISA. And also currently the transaction latency in bitcoin is about
10 minutes and for ethereum it’s about 1-3 seconds. However, in the future,
if Blockchain solutions are used by tens of millions of people and the number
of transactions is multiplied drastically, more research on e.g. latency, size and
bandwidth, and wasted resources needs to be conducted to ensure scalability.
2. Maintainability A block chain is a community of distributed databases that share
the same ledger. Transactions are aggregated, verified in blocks, and securely linked
together. A shared ledger creates transparent and traceable records. At its essence,
a block chain allows value to change hands digitally [41]. For example: In current
days smart contracts are very useful in building automated applications. Smart
contracts are digital contracts which has the capacity to replace the third party
transactions there by improving the maintenance and provides fast transactions
for the users. As discussed in chapter 5, how smart contracts helps to identify
the expired certificates and automatically update the Certificate Revocation Lists
(CRL). However in the other hand, when there is a need to update something in
the block chain it takes from few seconds to few minutes depending on the proof
of work and number of nodes participating in the process. So maintenance of
block chain is not user friendly.
3. Manageability Though Block chain uses Distributed ledger technology to provide
decentralized infrastructure for transactions of data, It’s very difficult for a common
man to understand transactions in block chain. Because when some one wants to
use block chain as a data base , he may think that his data is safe. But the important
thing in public block chain is that data is available to all nodes participating in
the network. So it’s not advisable to store data directly in block chain rather as
discussed in chapter 5 storing data in anonymous form is important to prevent
others from studying the pattern of data.So there comes a important pre- requisite
to translate the readable data into non-readable form before storing in the block
chain. And also in terms of data size block chain has limitations in block size for
example: Bit coin also has a block size limit of 1 MB [39].So its very difficult to
manage large volumes of data.
58
6.2 Distributed light weight trust infrastructure using DNS
4. Security Data contained on the Distributed Ledger Technology(DLT) is crypto-
graphically secured, so it is mathematically implausible to cheat and expose the
data [42]. Each user of the network has a private and public key. The combination
of both these keys creates a unique digital signature on every transaction, keeping
everyone accountable. Using unchangeable records and encryption with access
limited to private and public keys, enhances security and flexibility. These sort of
security characteristics are quite unique to block chain and are some of the reasons
why it’s getting so much attention.
5. Cost Nowadays millions of euros are spend in IOT security on third party trans-
actions. For example. the amount paid to certificate authorities for certificate
maintenance. As discussed in chapter 5 regarding development of PKI manage-
ment system using Block chain has the ability to overcome the costs required to
perform third party transactions with the help of smart contract. But it also has
short comings as it requires a complete new infrastructure with large number of
node and very large computing power, so the capital costs required for building
this technology is very high. And also in order to verify the data and to add a new
block into the chain certain proof of work has to been done in computers with
high computing power which in turn increase the power consumption charges.
6.2 Distributed light weight trust infrastructure using DNS
1. Performance After the invention of internet till today Domain Name System (DNS)
plays an important role in our day to day life. Whenever we do browse or do
something using an Internet there is always some DNS query happening every
second. The performance of the DNS is mainly measured on the round trip time of
the queries. The round trip time is basically from the time taken by your resolver
at home to the corresponding authoritative domain servers. The query time below
can vary between 5ms up to 50ms (local ISP) depending on what the network is
doing, but most should be down < 20ms range [25]. The traffic of the domain
also plays a major in the variation in the round trip time of the query. The round
trip time of the query can also be improved by having Recursive cache resolvers
which stores the details of the lists of recently visited domains.
2. Maintainability Though DNS is an data base but its not an centralized data base,
rather DNS is designed in a hierarchical manner. Which helps the the domain
name providers to delegate the responsibilities based of his interest to different
sub levels, which makes it easy for administration. And also since DNS is widely
accepted in the world, each authoritative server has many replications around the
world in different data centres based on the region in order to provide fast access
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to the customers. So the single point of failure is also avoided. According to the
implementation of data authentication in an IOT sensor network the zones of the
DNS was initially delegated based on countries and these has the corresponding
name servers which are responsible for handling sensor information of the country.
And in third level there were different trust scheme zone file of the sensor which
is managed by different teams. So this makes easy administration in the IOT
network.
3. Manageability Though DNS has limitation in storing data in the zone file, it has
many useful records like MX, URI to handle mail servers and http requests to
access data in external database. This makes the DNS more attractive to handle
external domains data there by providing inter operability among domains. As
discussed in chapter 4 how an level three trust scheme zone file was linked to an
independent Trust scheme publication authority there by reducing the overload in
the DNS server. So the end user who takes care for the maintenance of the sensor
need not know all the details of the DNS, he just need to maintain the details
of the sensor in a web page. So it makes him easy to manage the data without
worrying too much about the technology behind it.
4. Security Initially when DNS was invented it was just considered as a database to
translate human readable domain name into IP address. But by the time many
new Resource Records like PTR, URI, has been introduced which is used to redirect
or point to some different servers. After late 90 ’s and in early of 21 st century all
the Banking software was started being linked to the interent. Since all the queries
in Internet happens through DNS it is important for the service providers and also
for the domain authorities to secure the DNS and provide secured transaction for
the customers. This leads to the evolution of DNSSEC and TLS security which
makes the DNS more secured. All these advance security techniques had been
incorporated in building the infrastructure of data authentication in an IOT sensor
network using DNS in chapter 4. The three level domain was secured using
DNSSEC , this prevents the intruders to introduce man in middle attack there by
making it more secured. And also the transport layer of trust scheme publication
authority (TSPA) is secured in this infrastructure by verifying the certificates of
TSPA with the TLSA record in the DNS
5. Cost Since DNS infrastructure is an well established infrastructure with large
number of data centres around the world for speedy access of data. In order to
establish this infrastructure we need just internet and our own domain. Internet
Service providers (ISP) provide great service for very cheap price and also nowa-
days a domain can be easily designed and registered for few hundred euros with
domain registries like Go daddy [31]. Once the domain is registered the domain
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administrator has complete access to his zone file and design applications based
on his convenience.
6.3 Summary
The light weight distributed infrastructure using DNS has proved to be one of the
highly efficient, scalable and flexible infrastructure for an IOT network. But Blockchain
technology is not infinitely scalable. Due to large number of transactions, more and more
data needs to be stored in each block. A block has a finite size – meaning that the more
transactions there are, the faster they will fill up. Many block chain technologies have
increased their block size, but this is only a temporary fix. In light weight infrastructure
using DNS the problem of overloading of data in zone file is managed by linking external
databases via http requests and there by restrict the access by transport layer security.
In terms of queries DNS query is in terms of few milli-seconds where as the Block
chain technology query varies between few seconds to few minutes. And in block
chain there is no central master record of transactions.This has led to governance
challenges within the development community. Disagreements over what route to take
the technology in have caused irreparable splits, this has led to entire communities
splitting into “forks”. In light weight decentralized trust infrastructure the existing
globally approved infrastructure Domain Name System is being used. Though DNS claim
to be an distributed infrastructure with DNSSEC and DANE protocol for transport layer
security, it is controlled by ICANN or the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers which lays all the regulation for the functioning of DNS. It gives approval for
the TLD or the Top Level Domain names like .eu. It is the authority provider that accredits
the registrars like the GoDaddy to sell the rights of using the domain name.Where as
Block chain has huge potential for changing the world, Since the man-in-middle attack
can be completely eliminated because of complete decentralization[38] and using smart
contract the requirement of third party transactions are greatly reduced. However it has
some issues that are halting this progress, Complexity and issues with Scalability are
holding block chain back [35].
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7 Conclusion
Industry 4.0 era has brought great connectivity across devices to large production plants.
But recently sophisticated cyber threats had targeted critical infrastructures and smart
devices. So here security threats of the IOT network were analyzed and how LIGHTest
proposed decentralized light weight trust infrastructure using DNS has the potential to
increase the data authentication and there by reduce the man in the middle attack was
discussed. And using this light weight trust infrastructure data authentication in an IOT
network was demonstrated using an Raspberry pi cluster demo. And also four important
scenarios regarding the security threats faced nowadays by an IOT network in the aspect
of data authentication was investigated. The implementation of different scenarios and
distributed nature of trust lists in trust scheme publication authority has proved the
flexibility of the infrastructure. Since DNS infrastructure is accepted globally LIGHTest
has the ability to connect cross domains, So it can be easily adopted by Multi-national
companies. The application is not only limited to Industrial IOT but it can be also used
to in all authentication applications.
Block chain technology is one of the fast evolving technology and will impact in future
by providing many distributed solutions for security issues. The one application of block
chain technology in IOT network has shown data authentication using the anonymity
principle and zero knowledge protocol. The second application has shown how an
PKI infrastructure is completely managed using smart contracts which results in faster
update of Certficate Revocation Lists. And also using this chain of trust and smart
contract how it can be incorporated into an IOT sensor network for certificate validation
was also discussed.
Both the light weight distributed trust infrastructure using DNS and Block chain tech-
nology was analyzed based on performance, maintainability, manageability, security,
cost. Based on the analysis following inferences has been found in term of the use case.
Light weight distributed infrastructure is a good option for an semi-automated process ,
as discussed in data authentication of IOT sensor network where distributed access is
given to different manufacturers for maintaining the trust list in the TSPA. Because these
trust lists can be changed immediately and end user doesn’t require much knowledge to
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control the trust list. But block chain technology is mostly suitable for an fully automated
process with all predefined conditions and policies declared in smart contract. Because
it’s not simple to add something new or change something in the smart contract or in
the Block chain. Because when it comes in terms of security each and every second
matters.
Various experiments are going on to incorporate DNS with Block chain technology
to come up with a Blockchain-based DNS system.For example the Blockstack, the
Ethereum Name Service, and Namecoin. And also there is proposal to link to light weight
infrastructure using DNS and Block chain technology. For example: In light weight
distributed infrastructure the transport layer security is verified using the certificates and
the corresponding TLSA record in the zone file. But the validity of certificate is manually
checked by the maintenance team. But block chain has the smart contract to automate
this validation process by adding corresponding TLSA record with the certificate expiry
date to the block chain. On expiry of the certificate the smart contract can automatically
notify the manufacturer of sensor regarding the expiry of certificate. This will be a part
of future work.
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